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On August 22, 1996, President Bill Clinton signed into law
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1996.1 The Act was, in fact, the third welfare reform
bill that the 104th Congress had passed and sent to the President
for his signature. Clinton vetoed the first two proposals on the
grounds that they were "too harsh on children."2 Political pres-
sure to reform welfare stems from the unpopularity of Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC),' the federal pro-
gram most frequently referred to as "welfare." Efforts to change
or even dismantle AFDC, such as those outlined in the Contract
with America,4 have generally been met with enthusiasm by the
* Greg Duncan is a Professor of Human Development and Social Policy,
Gretchen Caspary is a Graduate Research Assistant in Human Development and
Social Policy, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois. We gratefully
acknowledge support from the National Institute for Child Health and Human
Development through its Child and Family Well-being Research Network. We
are also very appreciative of the information and advice provided by Rebecca
Blank and John Sciamanna.
1. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, 2113 (1996).
2. Todd S. Purdum, Clinton Seeks New Welfare Bill, Saying G.O.P. Plan is too
Harsh, N.Y. Tisms, Apr. 19, 1995, at 4. On January 9, 1996, Clinton vetoed H.R_
4, 104th Cong. (1995), the welfare reform conference committee bill, saying
that the bill's budget cuts "would fall hardest on children and undermine
states' ability to move people from welfare to work." Robert Pear, Clinton Vetoes
G.O.P. Plan to Change the Welfare System, N.Y. TimEs, Jan. 10, 1996, at 5.
3. Social Security Act, ch. 531, §§ 401-006, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-615 (West
1988 & Supp. 1996).
4. The Contract with America was composed of ten "Acts" or bills, each of
which the Republican members of the House of Representatives of the 104th
Congress intended to turn into law. The third of these Acts, the "Personal
Responsibility Act," had the greatest potential bearing on AFDC. On March 8,
1995, the House passed a version of this Act, H.R. 1157, 104th Cong. (1995),
described as "a bill to restore families, promote work, protect endangered
children, increase personal responsibility, attack welfare dependency, reduce
welfare fraud, and improve child support collections." However, the Personal
Responsibility Act did not pass the Senate. See GPO (Government Printing
Office) Access 141, History of Bills On-line, (visited Feb. 14, 1997) <http://
www.access.gpo.gov>.
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public. Three-quarters of American adults favor limiting welfare
receipt to two years, and over half advocate a decrease in federal
welfare spending, according to the 1994 American National Elec-
tion Study.5
The widespread disdain for AFDC is based on many assump-
tions about both the use and perceived abuse of the program by
its recipients and the characteristics of these welfare recipients
and their children. Media accounts of welfare dependence often
reinforce the stereotype of three-generation black welfare fami-
lies languishing in dilapidated public housing projects and rais-
ing sons who are destined to live (and perhaps die from) a life of
crime and daughters who will soon become welfare-dependent
mothers themselves.6 The purpose of this Article is to provide
5. The questions asked of survey respondents were: "Another proposal is
to put a two-year limit on how long someone can receive welfare benefits. Do
you favor or oppose this two-year limit? If you had a say in making up the
federal budget this year, for which of the following programs would you like to
see spending increased and for which would you like to see spending
decreased? Should federal spending on welfare programs be increased,
decreased, or kept about the same?" Steven J. Rosenstone et al., American
National Election Study, 1994: Post-Election Survey (Computer file by National
Election Study, enhanced with 1992-93 data, ICPSR 2d. Ann Arbor, Michigan).
6. Negative media stereotyping of blacks in general and poor blacks in
particular, combined with the widely held but inaccurate public perception of
welfare recipients as being primarily black, may be one cause for the lack of
support for welfare among the majority of American adults. Several empirical
studies have attested to the negative images of blacks as portrayed in the media.
See Robert M. Entman, Blacks in the News: Television, Modern Racism and Cultural
Change, 69 JOURNALISM Q. 341 (1992) (a discussion of modem racism and the
portrayal of blacks on local television news). Entman's analysis suggests that
exposure to local television news over time provides viewers with a cumulative
image of blacks as "threatening, demanding, and undeserving of
accommodation by government." Id. at 359. Studies on attitudes toward welfare
recipients have found that the word "welfare" is often used and perceived as a
code word for "poor blacks." For a recent research example, see Martin Gilens,
Race Coding and White Opposition to Welfare, 90 AM. POL. Sci. Rzv. 593 (1996).
Gilens examined the large extent to which white Americans' racial attitudes
shape the position they hold on welfare; he found that "welfare" tends to be a
Irace-coded" term among whites, and that "racial considerations are the single
most important factor shaping whites' views of welfare." ld. at 601. In an earlier
paper, Gilens examined the way in which three major newsmagazines (Time,
Newsweek, and U.S. News and World Report) illustrated stories on poverty. Martin
Gilens, Race and Poverty in America: Public Misperceptions and the American News
Media (Sept. 1995) (unpublished paper prepared for the Annual Meetings of
the American Political Science Association). He found that these magazines
used a mixture of photographs that would imply to the reader that African
Americans constitute the majority of America's poor, when in fact only 29% of
poor Americans are black. Furthermore, in stories on the "least sympathetic
poor," i.e., nonworking able-bodied adults in the "underclass," every one of the
photographs were of blacks. On the other hand, blacks were severely
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perspective on these accounts by describing what we know about
the nature of welfare dynamics, both within and across genera-
tions. We will concentrate on research findings from studies
focused on the Aid to Families with Dependent Children pro-
gram, which, at the time of the 1996 reform legislation, was the
largest cash-assistance program directed at single-parent
families.7
underrepresented in photographs of the "most sympathetic" poor, the elderly.
Gilens concludes that this imbalance may pose the danger that "whites will
continue to harbor negative stereotypes of blacks as mired in poverty and
unwilling to make the effort needed to work their way out. By implicitly
identifying poverty with race, the news media perpetuate stereotypes that work
against the interests of both poor people and African Americans." See also
Ishmael Reed, It'sRacist, 15 AM.JoUuRNAtASM RExv. 22-23 (1993). Reed notes that
"[t]he media constantly portray blacks as the victims of social problems that are
more evident among whites. For example, only 39% of welfare recipients are
black . . . [y]et when reporting about such issues, local television news will
usually air tape of blacks." Id. at 22.
7. AFDC is the only cash-assistance program (as opposed to in-kind
benefit programs, such as the Special Supplemental Food Program for Women,
Infants and Children (WIC) or Medicaid) primarily directed at single-parent
families. See infra note 21 and accompanying text for a description of the AFDC-
Unemployed Parent Program. However, single-parent families may be eligible
for Supplementary Security Income (SSI) under certain circumstances. The
1996 Green Book describes relevant SSI eligibility as follows: Individuals cannot
receive both SSI payments and AFDC benefits and, if eligible for both, must
choose which benefit to receive. Therefore, SSI participation in a family that is
receiving AFDC is limited to receipt through the children. Children may
qualify for SSI if they are under age 18 (or under age 22 if a full-time student),
unmarried, and meet the applicable SSI disability or blindness, income, and
resource requirements. The child's impairment must be of severity comparable
to that of an adult whose disability prevents him from working. The Supreme
Court ruled in Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990), that in determining the
severity of a child's impairment, the Social Security Administration must
consider whether the limitations caused by the impairment substantially reduce
the child's ability to do the things and behave in the ways that children of a
similar age normally do. To be found disabled, children must have a medically
determinable physical or mental impairment that substantially reduces their
ability to function independently, and effectively engage in 'age-appropriate'
activities. This impairment must be expected to result in death or to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months. Children represent the fastest
growing segment of the SSI population; in 1974, children made up less than 2%
of the SSI caseload, but by December, 1995, children accounted for 15% of SSI
recipients. Eighty percent of these children live in their parents' home. A
General Accounting Office study found that the number of children receiving
SSI disability benefits more than doubled between 1989 and 1992, from almost
300,000 to 770,500. The report indicated that the huge increases in the
diagnosis of mental impairments-including mental retardation and attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder- accounted for more than two-thirds of the
growth in awards. The study found little evidence, however, that parents'
coaching their children to act out in disruptive behaviors to improve chances of
1997]
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By "welfare dynamics" we mean the temporal patterns of wel-
fare receipt and the extent to which recipient families mix
income from welfare programs with income from other sources,
most notably paid employment. Patterns of welfare receipt are
complicated by the fact that recipients often have a number of
distinct episodes of receipt, which are interspersed with paid
employment and either marriage or less formal partnerships.
The intergenerational component of welfare dynamics centers
on the issue of the extent to which children growing up in wel-
fare-dependent homes will themselves become recipients when
they reach adulthood.
Our discussion of welfare dynamics is framed within the con-
text of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Recon-
ciliation Act of 1996.8 The Act abolishes the open-ended federal
entitlement program Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), and replaces it with a block grant of federal funds to the
states. This block grant program, known as Temporary Assist-
ance to Needy Families (TANF), differs substantially from the
former AFDC program in its provisions.
The first major difference between the two programs is that,
as an entitlement, funding for the AFDC program increased in
response to increased demand, whereas the TANF block grant
amounts are fixed. Under AFDC, everyone who met the pro-
gram's requirements was guaranteed assistance. There is no
such provision for TANF; once a state's block grant and federal
supplementary and contingency funds are depleted, no addi-
tional federal funds are available to additional qualified
applicants.
The Act allocates a fixed total block grant amount of $16.38
billion per year for the years 1997 to 2002. State-by-state TANF
funding levels are tied to previous AFDC funding in that the
amount each state receives is determined by a complex calcula-
tion that includes previous state expenditures on AFDC benefits
and administration, Emergency Assistance (EA), and the Job
Opportunities and Basic Skills Training (JOBS) Program. States
obtaining SSI was widespread, but could not rule out its existence. To compare
the size of these programs, in 1995, AFDC paid out over $22 billion to 13.6
million recipients, while SSI paid approximately $4.1 billion to 906,000
recipients under 18 years of age. See Comm. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 104th Cong.,
20 Sess., 1996 Green Book (visited Feb. 19, 1997) <http://www.access.gpo.gov/
congress> (hereinafter 1996 Green Book).
8. A summary of the history and content of the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 is available on-line, and is the
basis for our description of the Act's provisions. American Public Welfare
Association (visited Feb. 19, 1997) <http://www.apwa.org/reform/reform.hun>.
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experiencing high population growth and/or with historically
low grant amounts per low-income person may be eligible for
supplemental grants as well. As of October, 1996, twenty states
were determined to be eligible for the supplemental grant.9 A
contingency fund exists to assist states experiencing economic
downturns, and contingency fund eligibility is triggered by either
high unemployment or an increase in food stamp demand.1 °
States may also qualify for loans" and performance bonuses. 12
In addition to these funding sources, states can obtain bonuses as
a reward for a decrease in out-of-wedlock births.'" The Act does
provide a relative floor below which state welfare spending can-
not fall: the Maintenance-of-Effort (MOE) clause requires states
to maintain yearly spending at a level of 80% of the fiscal year
(FY) 1994 welfare expenditures.14 The MOE rate can be lowered
to 75% for states that meet the work-participation requirement. 5
While the MOE clause obligates states to spend at least a certain
9. According to the Library of Congress' Congressional Research Service,
eligible states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. Id.
10. High unemployment is defined in the Act as being at least 6.5%, and
at least 10% higher than the same quarter in either of the two preceding years.
Food Stamp demand can serve as a trigger if the number of recipients, for the
most recent three months for which data is available, is 10% greater than the
monthly average number of individuals that participated in the Food Stamp
program in FY 1994 or FY 1995 (whichever is lower) in the corresponding
three-month period. Id.
11. The Rainy Day Loan Fund provides a $1.7 billion federal revolving
loan fund. Eligible states may not have incurred any penalties under the cash
block grant, and the maximum loan is 10% of a state's grant, for up to three
years. Id.
12. The Performance Bonus provides $1 billion over five years ($200
million per year) for cash bonuses to "high performing states" that meet the
goals of the program in fiscal years 1998 to 2002. The formula to be used for
determining state performance and award amounts is currently under
development by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, with the National
Governor's Association and the American Public Welfare Association. Id
13. For each of fiscal years 1999 to 2002, the Illegitimacy Reduction
Bonus Fund provides $20 million annually to each of the five states with the
greatest success in reducing out-of-wedlock births without increasing abortions,
compared with the previous two-year period. If there are fewer than five states
eligible for the bonus, the grant will be $25 million each. Id.
14. Includes FY 1994 spending on AFDC, Job Opportunities and Basic
Skills Training Program, AFDC-related child care, and Emergency Assistance.
Id.
15. Qualified expenditures include: cash assistance; child care;
educational activities (except most incidences of public education);
administrative costs (which are limited to not more than 15% of the total
spending); spending on families ineligible due to the sixty-month benefit
eligibility limit; and any other spending allowed under the grant. Id
1997] 609
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amount of money on poor mothers and children, they are given
extensive leeway in their implementation of this mandate. 6
There is a second major difference between the AFDC and
TANF programs: whereas AFDC allowed qualified families17 to
receive cash assistance for an unlimited duration of time, TANF
limits recipients to cumulative lifetime benefits of sixty months
(five years)." Additionally, recipients 19 must be employed 2° by
the time they have accumulated twenty-four months (two years)
of benefits.
How will these policy changes affect low-income mothers
and their children?2' To answer this question, it is important to
understand some aspects of the dynamics of welfare receipt.
16. For example, states may choose to provide only non-cash assistance,
such as vouchers or services; they are given the option of carrying over unspent
funds from one year to the next; they may make payments or vouchers for
employment placement programs; or they may implement an electronic
benefits transfer program. Id.
17. In order to qualify for AFDC receipt, families had to: have a gross.
income below 150% of the state's "standard of need," an amount which varied
substantially from one state to another; have at least one child in the house
under the age of 18; be headed either by a single parent or by an unemployed
parent with a history of work; and have assets of under $1000 (excluding the
home and one automobile valued at under $1500). See 1996 Green Book, supra
note 7.
18. States may opt for a more conservative time limit; for example,
Florida is limiting lifetime benefits to two years. States are not precluded from
using their own funds to provide benefits for more than five years. For families
currently receiving AFDC benefits, their five-year eligibility will begin to be
timed starting on the first day of their state's implementation of federal block
grant funds. If a state chooses to provide benefits only to children (i.e., with no
allowance made for any adult in the household), that state will not be subject to
the sixty-month limit on benefit receipt. A greater than sixty-month allowance
can be made to up to 20% of a state's caseload under circumstances of
hardship, including for victims of battery or extreme cruelty.
19. Mothers with children less than one year old may be exempted from
the work requirement.
20. In addition to paid public or private work, allowable work also
includes community service work, limited-time job readiness/job search
assistance, limited time vocational education, and in some cases schooling (e.g.,
high school completion).
21. In 1995, 90% of AFDC benefit expenditures went to single-parent
families through AFDC-Basic. The remaining 10% was distributed to two-
parent families in which the principal wage-earner was unemployed through
the AFDC-Unemployed Parent program (AFDC-UP). However, only 6.8% of all
AFDC-participant families received AFDC-UP. The reason that AFDC-UP
accounts for a disproportionate percentage of the total expenditures is that the
national average monthly benefits per family is 51% greater for families
receiving AFDC-UP ($550) compared to AFDC-Basic ($364). Because the vast
majority of AFDC recipients are single female-headed households, in this
Article we refer to recipients as "women." See 1996 Green Book, supra note 7.
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How long do recipients stay on welfare? Does the "typical" recipi-
ent stay on the program for one extended period, or does she go
on and off the welfare rolls? What causes women to go on and
off welfare? Which recipients are most likely to stay on for longer
periods? To what extent is welfare dependence handed down
from mother to child? Might a change in welfare benefits lower
the rate of non-marital childbearing among poor women? This
Article addresses these questions by reviewing what we know
about the heterogeneity of patterns of receipt, intergenerational
welfare receipt, and the effect of welfare benefits on the non-
marital birth rate.
II. THE DEMOGRAPHY AND DYNAMICS OF WELFARE CASELOADS 2 2
In this section we examine the changing demographic com-
position of the AFDC caseload, the varied duration and on-off
patterns of spells of receipt, and the events that are most likely to
prompt entry onto and exit from the welfare rolls. The better
able we are to identify families with likely long-term experiences,
the, more efficient and effective it will be to target resources in
order to reduce the problem of long-term dependence.
A. Snapshots of the AIDC Caseload
Who are welfare recipients? Information gleaned from
AFDC caseload records and published in the U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives Ways and Means Committee's Green Book provides
the snapshot pictures of welfare recipients shown in Table 1.23
22. See Greg J. Duncan and Wei-Jun J. Yeung, Extent and Consequences of
Welfare Dependence AmongAmerica's Children, 17 CHILDREN & YOUTH SERVICES REV.
157 (1995).
23. See 1996 Green Book, supra note 7.
1997]
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TABLE 1: VARIOus
% of all U.S. children
who live in AFDC
families
# of child recipients,
in millions
% of AFDC cases
with mothers under
age 20
% of children in
AFDC families under
age 3
% of AFDC recipients
who are black









1979 1986 1990 1994 1995
11.0 11.5 12.3 14.1 13.2
6.11 8.0 7.1 7.2 7.8 9.4 9.3
7 8 - - 8 6
15 17 19 22 24 24 -
45 44 43 41 40 36 -
13 15 14 10 10 8 -
There was a marked increase in the prevalence of receipt
around 1970 and then little change until the early 1990s. In
1970, 8.8% of U.S. children, 6.1 million in all, lived in families in
which AFDC was received (Table 1, rows 1 and 2). This
increased to nearly 12% in the early 1970s, but it was not until
the early 1990s that the fraction of American children living in
recipient families again changed significantly. By 1994, the
recession of 1990-1991 had helped to drive the caseload to 14.1%
of all children-some 9.4 million children in all. The upward
trend may, however, have begun to reverse itself-in 1995, the
number of children in AFDC-receiving families fell to 9.3 million,
or 13.2% of all American children.
The sustained growth in AFDC caseloads during the 1990s
through 1994 is puzzling.25 The decade began with a recession
which, not surprisingly, often pushes up caseloads. But the
caseload increase was sharper in the recession years of the early
1990s than the increase associated with the recessions of either
the middle 1970s or the early 1980s. Just as it is difficult to
24. Id. at tables 8-25, 8-27, 8-28. Table reads: "In 1970, 8.8% of all
children lived in families that received income from the AFDC program." Id.
25. Congressional Budget Office Staff Memorandum, Forecasting AFDC
Caseloads, with an Emphasis on Economic Factors 42 (July 1993).
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discern from the economic data readily available the reason for
this growth in the number of AFDC participants, it is hard to
understand why participation then fell in 1995. The smaller
caseload in 1995 may indicate a delayed effect of the post-
recession economic recovery on the poor, but it is too soon to
know if the trend reversal seen in 1995 has continued through
1996. With the state-level implementation of the TANF program
required by July, 1997, any continued decrease in the AFDC
caseload that might have come about as a natural result of the
post-recession economic recovery will be confounded with the
smaller number of families who will be eligible under the new,
more restrictive program. This fact will complicate research now
underway to sort out the extent to which demographic factors,
macro-economic forces, program rules and potential recipients'
willingness to enroll in the AFDC program account for the
caseload growth that was seen through 1994.
The characteristics of recipient families have changed
somewhat over these years. Fewer than one in ten welfare
recipients is under age twenty (row 3), although a substantial
number of older recipients (roughly one-third, according to
Bane and Ellwood)2 6 were under age twenty when they first
started receiving welfare. Somewhat more recipient families
(cases) involve very young children now than before (row 4),
although such cases still constitute only about one-quarter of the
total caseload. The fraction of cases involving blacks (row 5) or
families living in public housing (row 6) has declined somewhat.
Blacks are persistently overrepresented among AFDC recipients
throughout this period, although they never constitute a majority
of the caseload. Only one in ten welfare recipients lives in public
housing.
A recent report from the Census Bureau provides
complementary evidence on the characteristics of AFDC mothers
as of the summer of 1993.27 It shows that nearly half (43%) had
not completed high school and only 13% had worked at all in
the month prior to the survey that gathered the information.2 8
26. MARYJo BANE & DAVID ELLWOOD, WELFARE REALIIES: FROM RHETORIC
TO REFORM 54 (1994).
27. U.S. BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL BRIEF, MOTHERS WHO
RECEIVE AFDC PAYMENTS - FERTIIrTY AND SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS
(1995).
28. See Kathryn Edin & Christopher Jencks, Reforming Welfare, in
RETHINKING SOCIAL PoLIcY: RACE POVERTY AND THE UNDERCLASS (Christopher
Jencks ed., 1992). Although not showing up in surveys conducted by the
Census Bureau, ethnographic evidence gathered in Chicago and presented in
Edin and Jencks suggests that work in the formal or informal economy is nearly
universal among AFDC recipients. Edin conducted in-depth interviews with 50
1997] 613
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Although usually not living in public housing, a majority (56%)
of AFDC recipients did live in the central cities of the nation's
metropolitan areas. Almost nine in ten recipient mothers (89%)
were born in the United States.
B. The Duration of Welfare Experiences
A much more useful picture of recipients' experiences is
provided by information on the total length of welfare receipt,
from beginning to end, that adds together all of the individual
episodes that welfare "cyclers" may have. Data on the duration of
welfare experiences reveals the extent of short-term receipt-for
example, how many and which individuals complete their spell
of receipt within, say, one or two years. These kinds of data also
address the more important question of long-term receipt-how
many and which recipients receive assistance for total periods of
five or ten years. This is particularly important in contemplating
policies that would limit benefits or impose other conditions
according to the amount of time a recipient spends on welfare.
Much of the research on the duration of welfare has been
based on information gathered in large, nationally-representative
surveys, including the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).29
Each of these data sets has certain advantages and disadvantages.
The NLSY uses a larger sample size, but the sample is composed
of women who were between the ages of fourteen and twenty-one
in 1979. This means that findings taken from the NLSY sample
cannot be said to be representative of all American women;
rather they are just representative of this age cohort of women.
The PSID uses a smaller sample than does the NLSY, but because
the sample is not limited to a particular age group, findings from
the PSID are more reliably representative of all American
women.
LaDonna Pavetti takes a comprehensive look at the welfare
experiences of young, first-time AFDC recipients by estimating
the total number of years-regardless of the on-off patterns-
first-time recipients can expect to receive welfare over the ten-
welfare mothers in Cook County in 1988 and found that not a single one of
them lived exclusively on their welfare checks and only two of them came close
to doing so.
29. Center for Human Resource Research, National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (visited Feb. 25, 1997) <http://www.bls.gov/nlshome.htm>; Institute for
Social Research, Panel Study of Income Dynamics (visited Feb. 25, 1997) <http://
www.umich.edu/-psid>.
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year period following the point of first receipt.3" Although
Pavetti takes her annual data from a national survey (the NLSY)
rather than from caseload records, the correspondence is quite
close between the characteristics of the recipients in her sample
and those of official caseload data. Her estimates show that 42%
of first-time recipients can expect to receive welfare for only one
or two years and thus would not be affected by a two-year (or five-
year) time limit on benefits; 35% of first-time recipients can
expect to receive it for a total of five years or more and thus
would be affected by a five-year limit; if ten years is taken as the
definition of very long-term receipt, then only about one in four
(23%) first-time recipients fits the long-term stereotype.
In another study, Mary Jo Bane and David Ellwood use
nationally representative PSID data and find a somewhat lower
proportion of first-time recipients (36%; see the first column in
Table 2) who will receive welfare benefits for less than two years
than what Pavetti determined using NLSY data.31 Nevertheless,
the difference between the two studies is small, and, in either
case, the conclusion that some two in five first-time recipients
have quite short-term experiences runs contrary to stereotypes.
It suggests that for a substantial minority of recipients, AFDC
functions as a kind of income insurance, providing transitory
protection against income losses arising from a divorce, job loss,
or other income-threatening event. These recipients use welfare
benefits for a short period of time, get back on their feet, and
then leave the welfare system, never to return.
30. LaDonna Pavetti, The Number and Characteristics of Families Who
Will Potentially be Affected by Policies to Time-Limit AFDC Benefits (Aug. 5,
1996) (unpublished manuscript for The Urban Institute).
31. BANE & E.wooD, supra note 26.
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TABLE 2: TOTAL AMOUNT OF TIME SPENT ON AFDC FOR:
I) WOMEN FIRST STARTING TO RECEIVE AFDC AND ii)
FOR THE CURRENT CASELOAD
3 2
For Women First
Expected Total Starting to For the Current
Time on AFDC Receive AFDC Caseload
Less than 2 years 36% 9%
3-5 years 25% 15%
6-9 years 17% 19%
10 years or more 22% 57%
Total 100% 100%
These data on the short-term duration of many welfare
experiences also have implications for the design of welfare-to-
work programs. 3 Even in the absence of such programs, a
substantial share of recipients will permanently end their receipt
of welfare by marriage, work, or other means within a fairly short
time. This means that policies may be inefficient if they focus
interventions providing education or job search and training
assistance on recipients who have just begun to receive welfare,
since more than two-fifths of first-time recipients can be expected
to leave the welfare rolls permanently within two years, even
without the benefit of such programs.
On the other hand, most first-time recipients will receive
welfare for more than two years, and, in the absence of effective
programs to help facilitate exits from welfare,3 4 more than one-
32. Id. at 39. Table reads: "36% of all women first starting to receive AFDC
can expect to receive AFDC for a total of less than 2 years. However, of women
who are currently receiving AFDC, only 9% can expect to receive AFDC for a
total of less than 2 years." Id.
33. See David Ellwood, Targeting Would-Be' Long Term Recipients of AFDC
(1986) (unpublished report prepared for the Department of Health and
Human Services).
34. Several evaluations of welfare-to-work programs indicate the difficulty
inherent in preparing large numbers of welfare recipients for stable, gainful
employment. A seminal publication in this field is JUDrrH M. GUERON &
EDWARD PAuLY, FROM WELFARE TO WORK (1991). See also REBECCA M. BLANK, IT
TAKES A NATION: A NEw AGENDA FOR FIGHTING POVERTY (1997) (a non-technical
summary of evaluations of the effectiveness of welfare-to-work programs for
AFDC recipients). Blank notes that even minimaljob search assistance appears
to increase both work and earnings, especially for women who are not at either
extreme of job-preparedness, i.e., neither those with job skills and work
experience who would be likely to find ajob on their own without intervention,
nor those who have the least amount of job skills and education and need-
intensive training and assistance. Cost-benefit analyses indicate that the
government more than recovers the cost of such programs due to the savings in
9WELFARE DYNAMICS
third of all new recipients will receive welfare for at least five
years. Thus, there are more than enough longer-term recipients
to warrant concern about who they are and what might be done
to shorten the likely length of their welfare spells.
It is important to note that about three-quarters of first-time
recipients will have more than one "spell" of AFDC receipt (data
not shown in Table 2). In other words, among the women first
starting to receive benefits, three-quarters will stop for periods
lasting between several months and several years, but then return
to the AFDC rolls for at least one more episode of receipt. (The
figures in Table 2 lump together all of the individual spells in
calculations of total receipt periods.) The beginnings and
endings of these welfare experiences are often associated with
movements out of and into the labor force. And while work-
related exits from welfare are somewhat more likely to be
permanent, most women (65%) leaving welfare for work will
return to welfare at least once within the next five years.
3 5
Bane and Ellwood, using annual data from the PSID, stress
the importance of these "cyclers" among the long-term
recipients, pointing out that they constitute the majority of long-
term recipients.3' Here again, the data on welfare dynamics
challenge conventional wisdom in showing that most long-term
recipients are not continuous recipients. Rather, the dynamics
of welfare receipt produce an important subgroup of long-term
recipients who do indeed leave the welfare rolls for work but
then return.
welfare benefits. However, the increased earnings of these women are seldom
enough to lift them out of poverty, due to both the loss of welfare benefits and
the typically low-paying nature of these jobs. See also Manpower Demonstration
Research Corporation, The JOBS Evaluation: Monthly Participation Rates in Three
Sites and Factors Affecting Participation Levels in Welfare-to-Work Programs, (visited
July 1995) <http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/hsp/isphome.htm>. This evaluation
found that "early random assignment-based findings show that the three sites
appear to have produced large reductions in the numbers of individuals
receiving AFDC and to have resulted in more people becoming employed
during a two-year follow-up period," yet also warns that "[s]ince the current
welfare reform bills all specify monthly participation rates that start lower but
steadily increase to 50% by the year 2003, this estimate suggests that the sites
examined for this report all of which had substantial experience and ran strict,
mandatory, and successful JOBS programs would need to experience dramatic
changes in program rules and practices, welfare recipients' behavior, or
funding in order to reach the ultimate standards contained in those bills." Id.
35. LaDonna Pavetti, The Dynamics of Welfare and Work: Exploring the
Process by Which Women Work Their Way Off Welfare (1993) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University).
36. BANE & ELLWOOD, supra note 26.
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Boisjoly et al. examined the question of the implications of
TANF time limits given what is known about welfare dynamics.3 7
Using monthly (rather than annual) data from the PSID, these
researchers distinguish between time spent on welfare while also
employed, time spent on welfare while not employed, and time
off the welfare rolls. As we have just seen, the majority of long-
term welfare recipients cycle to some extent between public
assistance and work. Therefore, this research has important
implications for the work mandates included in the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.
If we were to observe the total caseload of recipients (not just
new, first-time recipients) beginning on Day One of TANF
implementation - July 1, 1997 - we would see that some 38%
of those women will reach the twenty-four month/no work time
limit in two years of continuous receipt. However, because of the
common off-and-on cycling phenomenon of welfare receipt, fully
two-thirds (66%) of the original total caseload on day one will
have accumulated twenty-four months of non-working receipt in
five years. In other words, two out of three of all the women who
are receiving TANF on Day One will, byJuly 1, 2002, legally only
be able to receive further assistance if they are concurrently
working. Furthermore, byJuly 1, 2005, two out of five (41%) of
the women in the original sample will face the loss of benefits
due to the cumulative five-year time limit on receipt.
It is unclear whether the cycling in and out of jobs and on
and off welfare is due to the unstable nature of the jobs available
to these women, to a lack of skills and preparation on the part of
the women themselves, or a combination of the two. In any case,
the work of Boisjoly et al. underscores the fact that, despite
welfare recipients' efforts at getting work soon after beginning
welfare, finding steady employment is the exception rather than
the rule.
Meyer and Cancian's analysis of the poverty status of women
in the five years following their first observed exit from welfare
further illustrates the tenuous financial situation of former
welfare recipients, including both those who stay off the rolls
permanently and those who eventually cycle back on. 8 Their
study, based on the NLSY, found that over half (55%) of former
37. Boisjoly et al., Time Limits and Welfare Reform: New Estimates of the
Number and Characteristics of Affected Families, (1997) (unpublished paper
prepared for the Population Association of America Annual Meeting, Mar. 27-
29, 1997, Wash., D.C.).
38. Daniel L. Meyer & Maria Cancian, Economic Well-Being Following an
Exit from AFDC (1996) (paper prepared for the Association for Public Policy
Analysis and Management Annual Research Conference, Oct. 31, 1996).
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recipients were still living below the poverty line one year after
exiting from the welfare rolls. The percentage of these women
in poverty fell, steadily but slowly, to 41% by the time they had
been off welfare for five years. Almost one in five (18%) were
poor in each of the five years following their first exit. In all five
years examined, three-fifths of the women (58%) never reached
even modest levels of financial success.3 9 According to this
analysis, women most likely to achieve economic well-being are
those with higher education, fewer or older children, and those
who were working, married, or partnered when they exited.
Women of color, as a group, did worse financially after a welfare
exit than did white women.
C. "Ever-received" Versus "Point-in-time" Views of Welfare Recipients
One subtle but very important distinction in understanding
welfare dynamics is between the nature of individuals who ever
receive welfare and individuals who are receiving welfare at any
given point.4" Since long-term recipients are much more likely to
show up as recipients at any given point in time, the welfare
caseload at any point contains many more long-term recipients
than the figures in the first column of Table 2 would suggest.4
Estimates of the duration of the "point-in-time" caseload are
given in the second column of Table 2. As the present discussion
suggests, long-term recipients dominate the caseload at any given
time. Fewer than 10% of current welfare recipients will have a
total period of receipt (including multiple episodes as well as
both past and future periods of receipt) lasting fewer than two
years, while more than three-quarters will have periods of receipt
of at least five years. In fact, more than half (57%) of the
39. Id. "Financial success" is defined here as having a family income that
is at least 200% of the poverty rate.
40. Mary Jo Bane & David Ellwood, The Dynamics of Dependence and
the Routes to Self-Sufficiency (1983) (final unpublished report to the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services).
41. Ia& Bane and Ellwood illustrate this point in the following way.
Suppose that a hospital has 100 beds, 99 of which contain very long-term
patients. The 100th bed is used by short-term patients, each of whom stays in
the hospital for only one day. Over the course of one year, there will be 464
patients in these beds-99 long-term patients and 365 short-term patients.
Thus, the fraction of patients ever in the hospital over the course of the year
who are short-term is very high-79% (=365/464). On the other hand, at any
point during the year, 99% of all beds will house long-term patients. Thus,
because the longer-term patients are much more likely to show up in a patient
count at any point during the year, they dominate the hospital "caseload" at any
point.
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caseload can expect (or could have expected, under AFDC) to be
on the rolls for a decade or longer.
Which view of welfare recipients-"ever-received" or "point-
in-time"-is the "best" one? The answer to that question
depends on the issue under discussion. For policies directed at
families just starting to receive welfare, the "ever-received" view,
with its large numbers of short-term recipients, is the more rele-
vant one. Most importantly, a substantial minority of the clients
of a program begun at the point of enrollment of first-time wel-
fare recipients would have made permanent exits from the pro-
gram even without the program.
Suppose, on the other hand, that the contemplated pro-
gram would be targeted on people currently receiving welfare
benefits. In this case, the "point-in-time" view, with its over-repre-
sentation of long-term recipients, is the more useful. "Point-in-
time" caseload policies are directed at the more difficult set of
welfare families with longer-term experience.
D. Events That Begin and End Welfare Spells
A conscious element of the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 is an attempt to
reduce the number of welfare spells associated with out-of-wed-
lock childbearing and to increase the number of work-related
exits." Only by tracking these kinds of events can the success of
welfare-reform efforts be established. At the same time, the
implementation of the 1996 welfare reform creates an important
new category of exits-an end to welfare receipt as a result of
time limits or sanctions for failing to work.
Boisjoly et al. examine trends in the frequency with which
spells can be linked to the various events, as well as information
on the duration of the AFDC spells according to the event that
was associated with the spell in the first place.4" As shown in the
42. Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 401, 110 Stat. 2105, 2113 (1996). Section 401,
Block Grants to States for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, reads in part: "(a)
In general... the purpose of this part is to increase the flexibility of States in
operating a program designed to... (1) provide assistance to needy families so
that children may be cared for in their own homes or in the homes of relatives;
(2) end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by
promoting job preparation, work, and marriage; (3) prevent and reduce the
incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and establish annual numerical goals
for preventing and reducing the incidence of these pregnancies; and (4)
encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families."
43. Boisjoly, supra note 37. The researchers use monthly PSID data and
consider a month in which any AFDC benefits are received as the beginning or
continuation of an AFDC spell. They require that a recipient not receive AFDC
for one month for a spell of receipt to be considered ended.
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first row of Table 3, they find that between 21% and 27% of first
welfare spells are associated with a first birth to a never-married
mother. Periods of receipt for these kinds of spells are particu-
larly long- 7 1% of them are continuing after two years, and half
after five years.
TABLE 3: EVENTS ASSOCIATED WITH WELFARE SPELL BEGINNINGS:
TRENDS AND DURATIONS OF RECEIPT
4 4
Event associated Percentage of all
with beginnings of beginnings associated Fraction of spells lasting
first spells of AFDC with the event at least:
1973-1982 1983-1991 2 years 5 years
First birth to never- 27% 21% 71% 51%
married mother
First birth to other 14 14 53 28
circumstances
Second + birth 18 17 60 39
Divorce/separation 23 20 48 26
Mother left parental 5 7 68 na
nest
Fall in mother's 26 23 65 30
work hours
Fall of work hours 32 24 52 33
of others in family
Although a divorce or separation is almost as frequently
associated with first welfare spells, the duration of divorce-
induced spells is considerably shorter-only half (48%) are still
in progress after two years and barely one-quarter (26%) last at
least five years. Employment-related AFDC spells are quite
common, and are associated with middle-length durations.
44. Johanne Boisjoly et al., Initial Welfare Spells: Trends, Events, and
Duration, With Implications for Welfare Reform (1996) (paper prepared for
the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management Annual Research
Conference, October 31 - November 2, 1996, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The
researchers used data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics). Table reads:
"27% of first welfare spells beginning between 1973 and 1982 were associated
with a first birth to a never-married woman. 71% of first welfare spells that were
associated with a first birth to a never-married woman were still in progress after
two years." Id.
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E. Characteristics of Short- and Long-term Recipients
We have seen that a key feature of welfare receipt is its heter-
ogeneous mixture of short- and long-term experiences. We turn
now to the question of whether certain characteristics of
recipients-for example, teen births or little schooling-enable
us to make sharp distinctions between short- and longer-term
recipients.
Pavetti contrasts the characteristics of recipients with short-
and longer-term periods of receipt.45 Table 4 reproduces some
key figures from Pavetti's analysis, showing various characteristics
of both short-term (twenty-four months or less) and long-term
(sixty months or more) recipients. For purposes of comparison,
the third column of Table 4 shows the characteristics of all first-
time recipients taken together.46
TABLE 4: CHARACTERISTICS OF AFDC RECIPIENTS BY TOTAL TIME
ON WELFARE
4 7
Percent of Short- and Long-Term Recipients
With Given Characteristic
Characteristics at
start of first Short-term: 24 Long-term: 60
AFDC spell months or less months or more All recipients
High school 35% 63% 47%
dropout -no
GED
No prior work 30% 50% 39%
experience
Under age 25 44% 64% 53%
when began to
receive benefits
Never-married 48% 72% 58%
when began to
receive benefits
45. LaDonna Pavetti, Policies to Time-Limit AFDC Benefits: What Can
We Learn from Welfare Dynamics? (1994) (unpublished manuscript). See also
LaDonna Pavetti, Who Is Affected by Time Limits? WELFARE REFORM BRIES
(Urban Institute, D.C.), May, 1995, at 1-3.
46. In contrast to the "point-in-time" caseload data of Table 1, the "all
recipient" information of Table 4 is drawn from the "ever-on" group of
recipients who first started to receive AFDC at some point between the late
1970s and late 1980s. As we saw in the previous discussion, "ever-on" samples
have many more short-term recipients than "point-in-time" samples.
47. Pavetti, supra note 35, at 3. Table reads: "35% of women whose total
period of receipt last less than two years are high-school dropouts." Id.
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Race/Ethnicity:
Black 23% 34% 28%
Hispanic 13% 23% 16%
Not surprisingly, completed schooling, prior work
experience, age, marital 'status, and race and ethnicity are all
predictive of the likely duration of welfare receipt. Nearly two-
thirds (63%) of long-term recipients failed to graduate from
high school or earn a GED. In contrast, only about one-third of
short-term recipients lacked such educational credentials.
Except for race and ethnicity, similar strong differences show up
across all of the other demographic measures. In the case of race
and ethnicity, there is some tendency for blacks and Hispanics to
be overrepresented among the longer-term recipients, but the
differences are less pronounced than for the other measures.
A look at the "Long-Term" column of Table 4 shows how few
of the longer-term recipients have job-related skills. At the
beginning of their first welfare receipt, nearly two-thirds of
longer-term recipients had neither a high-school diploma nor a
GED; half had no work experience; and two-thirds were under
the age of twenty-five. Nearly three-quarters of long-term
recipients had never been married, which suggests a limited
payoff to this group from more aggressive child-support
enforcement measures.4 8
III. Is THERE AN INTERGENERATIONAL COMPONENT To
WELFARE RECEIWIr?
Dependence and deprivation have important intergenera-
tional dimensions, since children's success as adults is affected by
the family, neighborhood, and school environments in which
they are raised. To help frame the issues, consider the
intergenerational linkages in welfare receipt shown in Table 5.
The table is based on data from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics on daughters whose parents' welfare receipt was
observed when the daughters were between the ages of fourteen
and sixteen and whose own welfare status was observed when the
daughters were between twenty-one and twenty-three years of
age.49 It is clear from the table that the majority of daughters
48. See also Gary Burtless, Employment Prospects of Welfare Recipients, in THE
WORK ALTERNATIVE: WELFARE REFORM AND TmE REALITIES OF THE JOB MARKET.
(Demetra Smith Nightengale & Robert H. Haveman eds., 1995) (details on the
job readiness of welfare recipients).
49. Greg J. Duncan et al., Welfare Dependence Within and Across Generations,
239 SCIENCE 467 (1988).
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from highly-dependent parental families did not share the fate of
their parents: only 20% of daughters from heavily dependent
homes were themselves heavily dependent in early adulthood,
and an additional 16% received welfare in some but not all of the
three years between ages twenty-one and twenty-three. Nearly
two-thirds (64%) of the daughters from heavily dependent
homes were receiving no welfare at all during this three-year
period.5"
TABLE 5: INTERGENERATIONAL PATrERNS OF AFDC REcEIPT 1
Dependence of
parents when Dependence of daughters when they are 21-23
daughters are 14-16 years old
No Moderate High Total
No 91% 6% 3% 100%
Moderate 62% 22% 16% 100%
High 64% 16% 20% 100%
50. All research on intergenerational welfare receipt to date involves
mothers and daughters, rather than mothers (or parents) and sons. This is
because, as noted in footnote 21, 93% of all AFDC recipient families are headed
by single mothers. The remaining 7% are two-parent families receiving AFDC-
UP. States were not required to provide AFDC-UP until 1990. While it may be
possible that welfare receipt is passed from parents to sons, because AFDC-UP
recipient families represent a small proportion of all AFDC participant families,
and because not all states offered AFDC-UP until 1990, the sample sizes of
participant families in longitudinal data sets (such as the PSID or the NLSY) are
too small to study. However, some research has been done on the effects of
parental welfare receipt on sons' outcomes. See, e.g., Mary Corcoran et al., The
Association Between Men's Economic Status and Their Family and Community Origins,
27J. HUM. R.souRcEs 575 (1992) (finding that men who were raised in welfare-
dependent families or communities are at a substantial disadvantage as far as
economic status in adulthood).
51. Duncan, supra note 49, at 469. Table reads: "91% of daughters whose
parents were not dependent on welfare when the daughters were ages 14-16
were not receiving welfare themselves when they were 21-23 years old." "No"
parental dependence means that no income from AFDC was reported by the
parent(s) of the daughters when the daughter was between ages 14 and 16.
"Moderate" parental dependence means that AFDC income was reported in
one or two of the three years when the daughter was between 14 and 16.
"High" dependence means that AFDC income was reported in all three years
when the daughter was between 14 and 16. "No" daughter dependence means
that no income from AFDC was reported by the daughter when the daughter
was between ages 21 and 23. "Moderate" daughter dependence means that
AFDC income was reported in one or two of the three years when the daughter
was between 21 and 23. "High" daughter dependence means that AFDC
income was reported in all three years when the daughter was between 21 and
23.
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At the same time, however, the fraction of daughters from
highly dependent homes who themselves become highly
dependent (20%) is several times as high as the fraction of
daughters from nonrecipient families who become highly
dependent (only 3%). So while the stereotype of lock-step
intergenerational welfare dependence is clearly inaccurate, it still
may be true that the environment of a welfare-dependent home
increases, perhaps substantially, the chance of welfare
dependence in the next generation.
The question of whether the tendency toward welfare
receipt is somehow passed from one generation to the next is of
keen interest to researchers, policymakers, and the public alike.
Intergenerational receipt is therefore one of the most-studied
areas of welfare research, and the literature on the subject is
correspondingly large. However, because there are so many
forces both within and outside of the family that can influence a
daughter's decision to receive welfare, many of which are
difficult or impossible to measure, the question of welfare
heritability is a very difficult one to determine.
One of the more sophisticated studies was done by
Gottschalk.52 Gottschalk examined the question of whether the
observed higher rate of welfare dependence among those who
have grown up in families receiving welfare is truly a direct causal
relationship, or simply a correlation based on other, unobserved
factors, such as residence in neighborhoods with poor schools or
few available jobs. He contends that if there is a causal
intergenerational link, then the daughter of a mother who does
receive welfare should be more likely to receive welfare herself
than would be a daughter whose mother did not receive welfare,
and vice versa. His findings suggest that there does appear to be
a causal link between a mother's welfare receipt and her
daughter's welfare participation later in life. The evidence for a
causal link was stronger for non-blacks than for blacks, however.
This may be due to the fact that blacks are more likely than other
racial groups to live in neighborhoods with concentrated poverty
and a lack of goods and services necessary for job-preparedness,
which would also tend to increase a daughter's likelihood of
welfare receipt, independent of her mother's behavior.
IV. WELFARE RECEIPT AND NON-MARITAL CHILDBEARING
The Census Bureau estimates that 6.3 million children,
some 27% of all children under age 18, lived with a never-mar-
52. Peter Gottschalk, Is the Correlation in Welfare Participation Across
Generations Spurious? (1995) (unpublished manuscript).
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ried mother in 1993. The 6.3 million figure is 70% higher than
in 1973."3 Rates of non-marital childbearing have increased dra-
matically at all age levels over the past twenty years. 4 Family
incomes of children in never-married families averaged $9272, as
compared with $43,578 for children living in households in
which two parents were present and $17,014 for children living
in families with a divorced mother. 5
Many people suspect that the nature of welfare programs-
the generosity of benefits, restricting payments to lone-parent
families, increasing benefits when women bear additional chil-
dren while receiving welfare-influences behavior, especially
bearing children out of wedlock, and thereby promotes welfare
dependence.56 Such suspicions are rooted in a belief that fertil-
ity and other decisions are affected by the larger economic and
social environment in which families live. But while a great deal
of attention has focused on the welfare-related "benefits" of fer-
53. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 27.
54. Trends in teenage childbearing are somewhat different from trends in
non-marital childbearing, and trends differ by race. Declining rates of marriage
for women of all ages have led to a steady increase in the fraction of all births
that are to unmarried women. Rates of teenage childbearing among non-white
women aged 15 to 19, while remaining higher than among white teenagers,
decreased steadily throughout the 1970s and through the middle of the 1980s
and have risen only in the past decade. The non-marital birth rate among white
women aged 15 to 19 has risen steadily since 1950, with the exception of a slight
decrease in the years 1970 to 1975, after which the rate increased sharply.
Because the white population is much larger than the minority population, the
overall rate of teenage non-marital childbearing has increased since 1950. See
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERV., PUB. No. 95-1257, REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON OUT-OF-WEDLOCK CHILDBEARING (1995). See also DEPARTMENT OF
EDUC., TRENDS IN THE WELL-BEING OF AMERcAN YOUTH (1993).
55. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 27.
56. Perhaps the best known example of a social scientist who makes this
argument is Charles Murray. See CHLARLEs MURRAY, LOSING GROUND (1986).
Murray blames the presence of social welfare programs for many social ills,
including "increasing unemployment among the young, increased dropout
from the labor force, higher rates of illegitimacy and welfare dependency." Id.
at 154. He contends that an increase in non-marital births is one of the
"rational responses to changes in the rules of the game of surviving and getting
ahead." Id. at 155. Murray's recommendation is that the major source of these
social problems-means tested social welfare programs, including AFDC-be
eliminated. In the absence of these programs, Murray predicts that
"[t] eenaged mothers have to rely on support from their parents or the father of
the child and perhaps work as well." Id. at 228. "Parents tend to become upset
at the prospect of a daughter's bringing home a baby that must be entirely
supported on an already inadequate income. Some become so upset that they
spend considerable parental energy avoiding such an eventuality. Potential
fathers of such babies find themselves under more pressure not to cause such a
problem, or to help with its solution if it occurs." Id.
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tility, divorce, and withdrawal from the labor force,5 7 the environ-
mental aspects of the "costs" of such decisions have been all but
ignored. What are these costs? What opportunities are forgone if
someone opts to engage in behavior that often leads to welfare
dependence? Certain career paths may be rendered impossible
or at least much more difficult if a woman becomes a lone par-
ent. Potential marriage partners may be less attracted to a
woman who has a child fathered by another man. The perilous
economic situation of lone parents, which limits their residential
options to low-income neighborhoods, means that they and their
children are less likely to benefit from neighborhood amenities
such as good schools, positive role models, safe, drug-free streets,
and perhaps a positive neighborhood "culture." As welfare bene-
fits differ from state to state, these various costs will also differ
from place to place. But they will vary from person to person as
well. A woman without job-related skills or abilities sacrifices few
career opportunities in the event of a non-marital birth. Further-
more, these costs have changed in recent years. The declining
labor-market prospects of low-skilled workers," particularly black
men, have no doubt reduced the marriage-related "costs" of non-
marital births.59 And neighborhood conditions have deterio-
57. The body of research in this area is enormous. See, e.g., Greg Duncan
& Saul Hoffman, Welfare Benefits, Economic Opportunities, and Out-of-Wedlock Births
Among Teenage Black Girls, 27 DEMOGRAPHY 519 (1990) (welfare and fertility);
Charles Murray, Welfare and the Family: The US. Experience, 11 J. LAB. ECON. 224
(1993) (same); Shelly Lundberg & Robert D. Plotnick, Adolescent Premarital
Childbearing: Do Economic Incentives Matter? 13J. LAB. ECON. 177 (1995) (same);
Gregory Acs, The Impact of Welfare on Young Mother's Subsequent Childbearing
Decisions, 31 J. HuM. RESOURCES 898 (1996) (same). See also John H. Bishop,
Jobs, Cash Transfers, and Marital Instability: A Review and Synthesis of the Evidence,
15 J. MARRIAGE & Fnm. 301 (1980) (welfare and marriage/divorce); David
Ellwood & Mary Jo Bane, The Impact of AFDC on Family Structure and Living
Arrangements, 7 REs. LAB. ECON. 137 (1985) (same); Michael T. Hannan &
Nancy Brandon Tuma, A Reassessment of the Effect of Income Maintenance on
Marital Dissolution in the Seattle-Denver Experiment, 95 Am. J. Soc. 1270 (1990)
(same); Irwin Garfinkel & Larry L. Orr, Welfare Policy and the Employment Rate of
AIDC Mothers, 27 NAT. TAx J. 275 (1974) (welfare and labor market
participation); F. Levy, The Labor Supply of Female Heads, or AFDC Work Incentives
Don't Work Too Well, 14J. HUM. RESOURCES 76 (1979) (same);John F. Ermisch &
Robert E. Wright, Welfare Benefits and Lone Parents'Employment in Great Britain, 26
J. HUM. RESOURcES 424 (1991) (same); Robert A. Moffitt & Anuradha
Rangarajan, The Work Incentives of AFDC Tax Rates, 26 J. HuM. RESOURCES 165
(1991) (same).
58. F. Levy & R.J. Murname, U.S. Earnings Levels and Earnings Inequality: A
Review of Recent Trends and Proposed Explanations, 30 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1333
(1992).
59. See WiLLIAM JuLius WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: TiH INNER
CrrY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLc, 63-106 (1987).
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rated in many urban areas; as of 1990, one-quarter of all urban
blacks and nearly half of poor urban blacks lived in neighbor-
hoods with poverty rates in excess of 40%-a threshold com-
monly employed to delineate "ghetto poverty."'6 Considerable
research has been devoted to the effects of the welfare system
itself on fertility and labor-market decisions. Less is known about
the role of neighborhood conditions and of marital and labor-
market opportunities.
A. The Role of Welfare Benefit Levels
Much of the research on the effects of welfare programs has
been devoted to the areas of employment and out-of-wedlock
childbearing. The extent to which income transfers in fact influ-
ence the labor-market behavior of adults is a matter of relatively
little debate. The most comprehensive assessments conclude
that disincentive effects are indeed present, particularly for the
labor supply of female household heads.6 The disincentives are
such that the typical AFDC recipient who is currently working
about nine hours per week would work about fifteen hours per
week in the absence of an AFDC program.62
Much more controversial are the effects of benefit levels on
demographic behavior, in particular out-of-wedlock fertility. If
benefit levels were to influence non-marital birth rates, one
would logically expect non-marital births to increase or decrease
with corresponding changes in benefits. However, a look at sim-
ple descriptive data does not support such a relationship. For
example, since 1975 the rate of out-of-wedlock childbearing
among teens has nearly doubled, while the inflation-adjusted
value of AFDC, Food Stamps, and Medicaid benefits has fallen.
Meanwhile, states with the largest decreases in the inflation-
adjusted value of AFDC benefits have not experienced decreases
or smaller increases in out-of-wedlock childbearing. Conversely,
nearly all Western European countries have much more gener-
ous welfare programs for single mothers, and yet much lower
60. P. A. Jargowsky, Ghetto Poverty Among Blacks in the 1980s, 13 J. POL'Y
AN~ALsis 288 (1994). The author documents the extent to which "[g]hetto
poverty among blacks increased, both in terms of the number of blacks living in
ghettos and as a percentage of the black population. The black poor became
increasingly isolated in ghettos, with nearly half of the black poor in
metropolitan areas living in a ghetto neighborhood. The physical size of
ghettos expanded rapidly, even in some metropolitan areas where the
percentage of blacks living in ghettos declined." Id. at 288.
61. See, e.g., Robert Moffitt, Incentive Effects of the US. Welfare System, A
Review, 30J. ECON. LrrERA-rua 1 (1992).
62. Id. at 16.
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teen birth rates, than the United States. Most empirical analyses
likewise fail to demonstrate convincingly a significant causal rela-
tionship, or even a consistent correlation, between welfare bene-
fits and non-marital childbearing.63 Moffitt's recent review of
twenty-four published studies points to little consensus.64 Some
studies have found evidence that higher welfare benefit levels are
associated with higher out-of-wedlock birth rates among white
females. Almost none of the studies have found such effects for
black females. As Moffitt puts it: "The studies are not conclusive
... . so we are left with only the suggestion of an effect at
present."
65
The indications are that the circumstances and influences
surrounding the decision to bear a child outside of marriage are
far too complex to be dominated by the level of available welfare
benefits. Thus, taken as a whole, the scientific evidence does not
support the idea that welfare reform by itself will solve the prob-
lem of out-of-wedlock childbearing.
63. Some researchers have attempted to study the impact of recent
welfare reforms in New Jersey as an indicator of the incentive effects of AFDC
benefit levels on non-marital childbearing. In 1992, the NewJersey legislature
passed a welfare reform plan which included a "family cap" as one aspect of a
comprehensive, far-reaching reform package that also included training
programs, placement tests, money for college tuition, and increased attention
and guidance from caseworkers. A family cap provision denies additional cash
benefits to a woman who conceives an additional child which receiving AFDC.
Efforts to determine the effects, if any, of the family cap on the non-marital
fertility of AFDC recipients in NewJersey have been inconclusive, both because
the non-marital birth rate following the announcement of this welfare reform
policy fell among both AFDC recipients and non-recipients, and because of the
difficulty inherent in separating the effect of the family cap from other aspects
of the welfare reform. For a brief discussion of research on the New Jersey
welfare reform and possible alternative explanations for the decrease in non-
marital fertility, see Ted G. Goertzel & Gary S. Young, New Jersey's Experiment in
Welfare Reform, 125 PuB. INTEREST 72 (1996).
64. Robert Moffitt, The Effect of the Welfare System on Non-Marital
Childbearing, in DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERVICES, REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON OUT-OF-WEDLOCK CHILDBEARING (1995). Moffitt reviewed 24
studies, each of which employed one of four different methods of analysis to
examine the effects of welfare on non-marital childbearing. Of these studies,
17 showed mixed or no effect of welfare on non-marital childbearing. One
study found a negative effect and one study had contradictory findings. Of the
five studies that did suggest positive effects, only three had consistently positive
effects; one found positive effects only for whites, and the other found positive
effects only for blacks. See also WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WoRsu DISAPPEARS:
THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR (1996) (providing a non-technical
summary of empirical studies of the effects - or lack thereof - by race, of the
level of welfare benefits on the non-marital birth rate among teenage girls).
65. Moffitt, supra note 61, at 172.
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V. CONCLUSION
The vast differences in welfare experiences demonstrate that
there is no single "typical" pattern of receipt. Heterogeneity of
experiences-a mixture of long- and short-term receipt-is indis-
putable and any policy discussion must be based on an under-
standing of this heterogeneity.
The heterogeneity of welfare experiences has important
implications for the likely impact of the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, given its five-
year lifetime benefit limit.66 Only a minority of first-time welfare
recipients accumulate as many as five years of experience. Most
of them fall into the "cycler" category, with no single episode last-
ing very long but with enough repeated episodes to accumulate a
total of sixty months or more. Furthermore, welfare recipients
reaching a sixty-month limit are much less employable than the
average recipient. Nearly two-thirds lack a high school degree
and half had no work experience prior to beginning to receive
AFDC.
Because of the dynamics of welfare experiences, there are
also stark differences in the characteristics of first-time ("ever-
on") recipients and the population of the welfare caseload at any
given point ("point-in-time"). Only a minority of women first
beginning to receive AFDC will become long-term recipients.
But because long-term recipients are much more likely than
short-term recipients to show up in the caseload at any given
point, the rolls are always dominated by longer-term recipients.
This has important implications for welfare-to-work interven-
tions. If directed at recipients when they first start to receive wel-
fare, these programs will be serving a largely employable group,
many of whom will leave the welfare rolls even without assistance.
If directed at the existing welfare caseload, these programs will
be serving a group that, by and large, lacks job skills and experi-
ence. While they are expensive, interventions have proved cost-
effective for long-term recipients.67
The Act incorporates time limits and work requirements but
offers little money to fund the training programs needed to facil-
itate welfare-to-work transitions. Here the demographics of wel-
fare receipt lead to the discouraging conclusion that most of the
mothers running up against a five-year limit will not be at all
attractive as potential employees. It is hard to see how most of
these mothers will make successful transitions into the labor mar-
ket without substantial job-search and training interventions.
66. Pavetti, supra note 30.
67. JUDITH M. GUERON & EDWARD PAULY, FROM W=ARE TO WoRK (1991).
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Whether growing up in a welfare-recipient family adversely
affects the life chances of children is an important and as yet
unresolved research question.6" It is clear that the association
between the welfare experiences of parents and children is far
from perfect; in fact most daughters growing up in welfare-
dependent homes are not themselves dependent on welfare
when they are young adults.
The more subtle question is whether there are any signifi-
cant intergenerational linkages after adjusting for all of the con-
ditions-low income, single-parent family structure, etc.-
associated with welfare-recipient families. While it is not defini-
tive, the evidence on this question does indeed suggest an
intergenerational linkage. In other words, a welfare reform that,
everything else the same, reduces the number of recipient fami-
lies is likely to improve the life chances of the children growing
up in recipient families.
Of course, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportu-
nity Reconciliation Act of 1996 does not keep "everything else
the same." In all likelihood, time limits and work requirements
will: i) increase the amount of time mothers spend in the labor
force and reduce their time at home with their children; ii) for a
minority of recipients, reduce further the below-poverty living
standards of families who are unable to find jobs after reaching
the time limits on receipt; iii) also for a minority of recipients,
launch mothers into successful labor-market careers; and iv) for
some recipients losing their benefits, increase multi-generational
living arrangements of mothers and children.
We do not presume to understand all of the ways in which
these changes will affect welfare recipients and the life chances
of their children. It is clear, however, that discussions of the
implementation of this welfare reform law should first address
the issue of the families likely to run up against such limits. With
little money for training and no provision of fall-back subsidized
employment, the Act will eventually cut off benefits for substan-
tial numbers of families headed by hard-to-employ mothers. Of
course, in the block-grant, few-strings-attached policy world of
the future, states may elect to provide as much training and fall-
back employment as they want. However, these are costly fea-
tures of welfare reform and will not be feasible if states use only
the resources provided in the block grants.
68. "Life chances" in this context refers to what is commonly thought of
as "success" in American culture: a child's likelihood of growing up to become
an independent adult, able to adequately support himself or herself and his or
her dependents.
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Finally, the rationale of "sending a message" to prospective
teen mothers often accompanies proposals to limit welfare bene-
fits, either by time or demographic status. However, research on
links between welfare benefits and teen out-of-wedlock childbear-
ing provides little reason to believe that the message will have a
measurable effect on the number of teenagers, especially black
teenagers, who bear children out of wedlock.
